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Animal Rights Activism and the
Constitution: Are Ag-Gag Laws
Justifiable Limits?
JODI LAZARE*
It is a troubling time to be an animal rights activist in Canada. Recently, Alberta adopted
legislation to create harsh penalties for trespassing onto private property, for obtaining
permission to enter private property based on false pretences, and for interfering with
vehicles on public highways. These laws relate to agricultural lands, to private property
generally, and, where roads are concerned, to public property. Ontario has adopted similar
legislation aimed specifically at agricultural property. The legislation in both provinces
purports to protect the security of farmers, their families, and rural property owners
generally, as well as the safety of the food system, by preventing contamination of farmed
animals by trespassers and those who would interfere with farmed animals in transport.
*
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In truth, these laws, known as ag-gag (or agricultural gag) laws, aim to suppress animal
rights activism and prevent undercover investigations of industrial animal agriculture. New
in Canada, ag-gag legislation has been adopted and subsequently struck down in the United
States as an unconstitutional limit on freedom of speech. This article suggests that Canadian
ag-gag laws are likewise unconstitutional. They limit high-value constitutionally protected
expression, interfere with the public’s right to know how their food is produced and how the
law fails to protect farmed animals, and cannot be justified under section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Doctrinal in nature, this article fills a gap in Canadian legal scholarship on the constitutional
dimensions of animal rights activism as well as the legality of limits on the activities of
activists. It contributes to our understanding and interpretation of section 1 of the Charter
and the permissible scope of government interference with fundamental freedoms. Its
relevance also goes beyond the activities of animal rights activists. Public attention to animal
agriculture and meat production is at an all-time high, not only with respect to the treatment
of farmed animals, but also regarding working conditions for humans in light of the high
incidence of COVID-19 infections in slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada, and
the demonstrated connections between industrial farming, animal confinement, and the
spread of zoonotic diseases. Moreover, the environmental degradation caused by intensive
animal farming is garnering increased interest and awareness among members of the public
and governments. Finally, the article makes a small, but much-needed intervention into
the growing Canadian literature on agricultural exceptionalism and challenges the historic
privileging of the agricultural industry by legislators and policymakers.
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IT IS A TROUBLING TIME to be an animal rights activist in Canada. In 2019,
Alberta amended its trespass legislation to create harsh penalties, including
potential imprisonment, for trespassing onto private property and for obtaining
permission to enter private property based on false pretences.1 In 2020, the
province prohibited obstruction of, or interference with, public infrastructure,
including highways and agricultural operations.2 In Ontario, since 2020,
1.
2.

Bill 27, Trespass Statutes (Protecting Law-Abiding Property Owners) Amendment Act, 2019, 1st
Sess, 30th Leg, Alberta, 2019 (assented to 5 December 2019), SA 2019, c 23.
See Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, SA 2020, c C-32.7, s 2(3) [CIDA].
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it is likewise an ofence to enter a place where animals are kept without prior
authorization; there, too, entry based on false pretences is considered trespassing.3
Further, as in Alberta and, more recently, Manitoba,4 it is an ofence in Ontario
to “stop, hinder, obstruct or otherwise interfere with a motor vehicle transporting
farm animals,”5 and to “interfere or interact with a farm animal being transported
by a motor vehicle without the prior consent of the driver of the motor vehicle.”6
In efect, the trespass legislation, seemingly introduced in response to a number
of instances where animal rights activists occupied spaces on industrial animal
farms and similar animal exploitation businesses,7 makes it illegal to gain
entry onto animal use facilities and to conduct undercover investigations of
those facilities.8 Where the provisions related to transport are concerned, the
legislation efectively prohibits demonstrations on public roads, a regular activity
of members of the “vegan anti-speciest and animal-centric organization” called
the Animal Save Movement,9 who protest outside of slaughterhouses in an efort
to “bear witness” to animal sufering and to spread awareness of the violence of
industrial animal farming.10
Te laws in both Alberta and Ontario are said to be grounded in the
general objective of protecting the food supply. Specifcally, the statutes
purport to respond to concerns about risks to the safety of farmers and their
families from those that trespass onto their properties; risks to the safety of
animal transporters when protestors interfere with moving vehicles; and risks
to animals themselves in terms of food safety and biosecurity. Te aim of the
legislation will be further examined below but, for present purposes, the stated
legislative objective illustrates its parallel with American laws known as “ag-gag”
3.

See Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, SO 2020, c 9, s 5 [Security
from Trespass Act].
4. Bill 62, Te Animal Diseases Amendment Act, 3rd Sess, 42nd Leg, Manitoba, 2020 (assented
to 20 May 2021), SM 2021, c 53 [Bill 62].
5. Security from Trespass Act, supra note 3, s 6(1).
6. Ibid, s 6(2).
7. See Jodi Lazare, “Ag-Gag Laws, Animal Rights Activism, and the Constitution: What is
Protected Speech?” (2020) 58 Alta L Rev 83 at 84 (detailing a number of occupations and
undercover investigations in Canada between 2014 and 2020).
8. Note that while the legislation may have been spurred by animal activism on private
property, it is not limited in application to the agriculture industry in Alberta.
9. Animal Save Movement, “About Us” (n.d.), online: <www.thesavemovement.org/about>
[perma.cc/LL6G-P362].
10. See Maneesha Deckha, “Te Save Movement and Farmed Animal Sufering: Te Advocacy
Benefts of Bearing Witness as a Template for Law” (2019) 5 CJCCL 77; Anita Krajnc,
“Bearing Witness: Is Giving Tirsty Pigs Water Criminal Mischief or a Duty?” (2017)
23 Animal L 479.
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or agricultural gag laws, which in their most recent iteration, involve the “creative
use of trespass laws to suppress information about public harms.”11 American
ag-gag legislation, aimed at limiting whistleblowing in the animal agriculture
industry, has taken many forms such as anti-trespass laws, anti-defamation laws,
and prohibitions on recording and disseminating footage from industrial farms.12
But all have had the same efect: “they limit speech critical of the agricultural
industry.”13 Importantly, a number of American statutes––all of which contained
prohibitions on entering an agricultural site based on a misrepresentation––have
been invalidated as unconstitutional limits on the First Amendment right to free
speech.14 As I suggest below, while the analysis difers, the same general reasoning
underlies the evaluation of the Canadian statutes’ validity under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).15
In an earlier article, I suggested that Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a limit
to the Charter right to freedom of expression.16 In this article, I make the case
that the legislation is not a justifable limit and is therefore of no force or efect,
pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.17 In other words, I sketch
out the analytical approach by subjecting the legislation to the test established in
R. v. Oakes for determining whether rights-infringing legislation may be justifed
in the interests of the collective.18 Specifcally, my analysis focuses on the laws in
force in Alberta and Ontario, the frst two jurisdictions to adopt ag-gag legislation.
However, the reasoning around section 1 should readily apply to parallel statutory
developments, such as Manitoba’s law as it relates to transport, and any future
legislation that might employ similar means to achieve the same objectives.19
11. Justin F Marceau, “Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future” (2015) 38 Seattle UL
Rev 1317 at 1319.
12. See ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. See e.g. Animal Legal Defense Fund v Wasden, 878 F (3d) 1184 (9th Cir 2018) [Wasden];
Animal Legal Defense Fund v Herbert, 263 F Supp (3d) 1193 at 1198 (D Utah 2017)
[Herbert]; Animal Legal Defense Fund v Reynolds, 353 F Supp (3d) 812 (SD Iowa
2019) [Reynolds].
15. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter].
16. See Lazare, supra note 7.
17. s 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
18. [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
19. See e.g. Daphné Cameron, “Antispécisme: un groupe de travail pour empêcher d’autres
infractions,” La Presse (22 January 2020), online: <www.lapresse.ca/actualites/2020-01-22/
antispecisme-un-groupe-de-travail-pour-empecher-d-autres-infractions> [perma.cc/
V9VQ-C9Y6?type=image]. Te article discusses the creation of a Quebec governmental task
force to study how other Canadian provinces are dealing with on-farm trespassers.
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Part I of this article frst explains the legislative background and summarizes
my earlier argument that the activities targeted by ag-gag legislation are a form of
high-value, constitutionally protected speech. Next, in keeping with the section 1
framework, Part II examines the contextual factors that infuence the rigour with
which a court might approach the Oakes test. Part III then queries whether the
legislation has a pressing and substantial objective and suggests that, while the
government may struggle to meet its burden, the legislation would, nevertheless,
likely pass this step. Part IV argues that the legislation is not rationally connected
to the legislative objective. Part V shows that the provisions are not minimally
impairing. Last, Part VI suggests that the legislation is not proportionate in its
negative and positive impacts, independent of the legislative purpose.
Tis article is primarily doctrinal in nature. It draws on legislation, case
law, Hansard, and relevant scholarship on constitutional rights interpretation.
It is also partly comparative, drawing as it does on the body of American
scholarship on ag-gag legislation and the First Amendment, and looking to
the American case law striking down similar laws. As with my earlier work on
Canadian ag-gag legislation, this article flls a gap in Canadian legal scholarship
on the constitutional dimensions of animal rights activism as well as the legality
of limits on the activities of activists. It should accordingly contribute to our
understanding and interpretation of section 1 of the Charter and the permissible
scope of government interference with fundamental freedoms. To that end,
it might serve as a reminder that section 1 was conceived of as setting a high
threshold to justify rights violations—as an exception to the guaranteed rights
and freedoms contained in the Charter, and not the rule.
Further, the discussion of Alberta’s Critical Infrastructure Defence Act,
adopted in response to blockades and protests aimed at pipeline development,20
coupled with the existence of similar legislative trends in other jurisdictions21

20. Jennifer Koshan, Lisa Silver & Jonette W Hamilton, “Protests Matter: A Charter Critique
of Alberta’s Bill 1” (9 June 2020), online (blog): ABlawg.ca <ablawg.ca/2020/06/09/
protests-matter-a-charter-critique-of-albertas-bill-1> [perma.cc/AQ6Y-2JCL]; Alberta,
Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-2 (26 February 2020) at 12
[Alberta Hansard (26 February 2020)].
21. See e.g. US, SF 2235, An Act relating to criminal acts committed on or against critical
infrastructure and providing penalties, 87th Gen Assem, Reg Sess, Iowa, 2018 (enacted); US,
HB 3557, An Act relating to civil and criminal liability for engaging in certain conduct involving
a critical infrastructure facility; creating criminal ofences, 86th Leg Assem, Reg Sess, Tex, 2019
(enacted); US, SB 2044, An Act to amend and reenact section 12.1-21-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code, relating to tampering with or damaging a critical infrastructure facility or a public
service; and to provide a penalty, 66th Leg Assem, Reg Sess, ND, 2019 (enacted).
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and the rise of climate protests,22 makes this work relevant to activism and the
issues it responds to beyond animal rights. Tis article comes at a time when
public attention to animal agriculture and meat production is at an all-time high,
not only with respect to the treatment of farmed animals, but also regarding
working conditions for humans in light of the high incidence of COVID-19
infections in slaughterhouses in the US and Canada,23 and the demonstrated
connections between industrial farming, animal confnement, and the spread
of zoonotic diseases.24 Indeed, it is no longer possible to turn a blind eye to
the risks to human health associated with industrial animal farming and the
relationships between intensive animal agriculture, the spread of zoonotic
pathogens, and the increased microbial resistance that results from the regular,
prophylactic use of antibiotics in food production.25 Likewise, with respect to
our natural environment, the connection between industrial animal farming and
environmental harm is clear: “[T]he animal agriculture industrial complex is one
of the major causes of human-induced global greenhouse gas emissions.”26 Tose
concerned about our changing climate should be troubled by legislation that

22. See e.g. Sandra Laville & Johnathan Watts, “Across the Globe, Millions Join Biggest
Climate Protest Ever,” Te Guardian (21 September 2019), online: <theguardian.com/
environment/2019/sep/21/across-the-globe-millions-join-biggest-climate-protest-ever>
[perma.cc/U5E9-BMMD]; Somini Sengupta, “Protesting Climate Change, Young People
Take to the Streets in a Global Strike,” Te New York Times (20 September 2019), online:
<nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.html> [perma.cc/ZQ83-XG94].
23. Sarah Berger Richardson, “Worked to the Bone: COVID-19, the Agrifood Labour Force,
and the Need for More Compassionate Post-Pandemic Food Systems” in Colleen M Flood
et al, eds, Vulnerable: Te Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 (University of Ottawa
Press, 2020) 501.
24. See e.g. Damian Carrington, “Coronavirus: World Treating Symptoms, Not Cause of
Pandemics, says UN,” Te Guardian (6 July 2020), online: <theguardian.com/world/2020/
jul/06/coronavirus-world-treating-symptoms-not-cause-pandemics-un-report> [perma.
cc/B7WZ-NBU5]; United Nations Environment Programme & International Livestock
Research Institute, “Preventing the Next Pandemic: Zoonotic Diseases and How to Break the
Chain of Transmission” (2020), online: <www.unep.org/resources/report/preventing-futurezoonotic-disease-outbreaks-protecting-environment-animals-and> [perma.cc/T33F-MLSH];
Silviu Petrova et al, “Post COVID-19: A Solution Scan of Options for Preventing Future
Zoonotic Epidemics” (2020), online: OSF <osf.io/5jx3g> [perma.cc/D55X-GRZF].
25. See Romain Espinosa, Damian Tago & Nicolas Treich, “Infectious Diseases and Meat
Production” (2020) 76 Environmental & Resource Economics 1019.
26. Núria Almiron, “Meat Taboo: Climate Change and the EU Meat Lobby” in Jason Hannan,
ed, Meatsplaining: Te Animal Agriculture Industry and the Rhetoric of Denial (Sydney
University Press, 2020) 163 at 163.
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seeks to shield the activities of an industry that is a signifcant contributor to
drought, environmental degradation,27 and global warming.28
Finally, this article makes a small but needed contribution to the growing
Canadian literature on agricultural exceptionalism, and the historic privileging
of the agricultural industry by legislators and policymakers. In Canada, while
some research examines the “special sociolegal place of agriculture within regimes
governing…diverse policy felds,”29 the economic and cultural importance of
animal agriculture and the “broader [legislative] trend of insulating agriculture
from the demands of a range of social justice imperatives” merit further attention.30
While I do not explicitly engage in this discussion, the section 1 analysis draws on
other examples of exceptional treatment of the agricultural industry by legislators
and courts in the context of limiting the labour protections guaranteed by
the Charter.31 Moreover, ag-gag legislation is, in essence, about immunizing a
specifc, self-regulating, private industry from public scrutiny so as to protect its
economic viability.32

27. See Kathryn Gillespie, Te Cow With Ear Tag #1389 (University of Chicago Press, 2018) at
193 [Gillespie, #1389].
28. See generally Trevor J Smith, “Corn, Cows, and Climate Change: How Federal Agriculture
Subsidies Enable Factory Farming and Exacerbate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (2019) 9
Washington J Environmental L & Policy 26; Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Does the Rule of
Ecological Law Demand Veganism: Ecological Law, Interspecies Justice, and the Global Food
System” (2019) 43 Vt L Rev 455.
29. Jessica Eisen, “Down on the Farm: Status, Exploitation, and Agricultural Exceptionalism” in
Charlotte Blattner, Kendra Coulter & Will Kymlicka, eds, Animal Labour: A New Frontier
of Interspecies Justice? (Oxford University Press, 2020) 139 at 143. For examples of Canadian
agricultural exceptionalism in matters other than the treatment of animals, see also Laura
Alford & Sarah Berger Richardson, “Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada: Exceptional
Protection for Standard Farm Practices” (2019) 50 Ottawa L Rev 131; Michael Trebilcock
& Kristen Pue, “Te Puzzle of Agricultural Exceptionalism in International Trade Policy”
(2015) 18 J Intl Econ L 233.
30. Eisen, supra note 29 at 142.
31. See Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94 at para 181 [Dunmore].
32. On a related note, a private member’s bill currently making its way through Parliament
would extend exemptions from the application of the carbon tax to fuels most frequently
used by farmers. See Bill C-206, An Act to amend the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act
(qualifying farming fuel), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (as passed by the House of Commons 23
June 2021, reinstated following the 2021 election).
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I. AG-GAG IN CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM
Tis Part provides an overview of the legislation in question in Alberta and
Ontario.33 In setting out the legislative landscape, this part also summarizes
the argument advanced in my previous work, that animal rights activism is
constitutionally protected speech and that, by suppressing the activities of
activists, ag-gag legislation constitutes a clear limit to section 2(b) of the Charter,
the right to freedom of expression.
As explained, Alberta’s Bill 27 created harsh penalties, including fnes of
up to ten thousand dollars for a frst ofence, twenty-fve thousand dollars for
a second, and up to two hundred thousand dollars for a corporation, as well
as potential imprisonment for up to six months for trespassing onto private
property.34 Te law also deems entry under false pretences to be trespassing.35 Bill
27 became law in December 2019.36 Importantly, while recent occupations by
animal rights activists of industrial animal farms were a signifcant driver of Bill
27,37 the trespass amendments were not limited to agricultural property. In fact,
due to its broad wording and application, the Alberta amendments make it illegal
to use false pretences to gain entry onto and, indirectly, conduct undercover
investigations on any private property in the province, subjecting ofenders to
those severe penalties.
Tat said, Alberta’s legislative developments in the form of trespass legislation
also specifcally target, and protect, animal agriculture. Alongside Bill 27, Alberta
33. Note, however, that Canadian ag-gag legislation is not limited to these jurisdictions. Tere
is legislation efectively prohibiting roadside vigils and slaughterhouse protests in force in
Manitoba. See Bill 62, supra note 4 (the wording of which mirrors the transport provisions
of Ontario’s law). Legislation has also been adopted in Prince Edward Island. See Bill No
120, An Act to Amend the Animal Health Act, 1st Sess, 66th Leg, PEI, 2020 (assented to 4
December 2020), RSPEI 2020, c 86; Bill No 124, An Act to Amend the Animal Welfare Act,
1st Sess, 66th Leg, PEI, 2020 (assented to 4 December 2020), RSPEI 2020, c 87. Prince
Edward Island’s legislation, while it indirectly limits animal rights activism on farms, may not
be as constitutionally problematic from a Charter perspective as the statutes examined here,
but it nevertheless singles out one industry for special protection. Combined, all these laws
evince a growing legislative trend in Canada. I have chosen to focus on Alberta and Ontario
as they were the frst Canadian jurisdictions to adopt these kinds of laws and, in doing so,
created serious ofences with troubling consequences.
34. See supra note 1.
35. Ibid.
36. Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-1 (28 November 2019)
[Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019)].
37. See the discussion in Part III, below, on the legislative objective.
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adopted a new regulation, the Biosecurity Regulation,38 under its Animal Health
Act.39 Similar to Bill 27, the regulation prohibits unauthorized entry into a
“biosecurity area” where livestock is or will be housed,40 subject to even higher
fnes than general trespass—up to ffteen thousand dollars for a frst ofence,
and up to thirty thousand dollars, or imprisonment for up to a year, or both
imprisonment and a fne, for a second ofence.41 Corporations, for their part,
are liable to a fne of up to two hundred thousand dollars.42 Te defnition of
“livestock” lists 29 diferent kinds of animals used for commercial purposes,
including “beef cattle,” “dairy cattle,” “poultry,” “swine,” and fsh kept pursuant
to a “commercial fsh culture licence.”43 Like Bill 27, where a person obtains
authorization to enter based on false pretences, that person is deemed to have
entered without authorization.44 Further, the regulation also indirectly prohibits,
subject to the same penalties, interference with transport vehicles carrying
animals, and interaction with the animals being transported.45
Soon after the trespass prohibitions were adopted, in February 2020, the
Alberta government introduced Bill 1, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act.46
Tat act purports to “reinforce public safety,” and to “strengthen penalties
against those who would lawlessly trespass or jeopardize public safety by seeking
to block critical public infrastructure, including roadways, railways, and other
important infrastructure.”47 Even broader than Bill 27, which is limited to private
property, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act prohibits the wilful obstruction,
interruption, or interference with “any essential infrastructure,”48 the defnition
of which includes highways and agricultural operations.49 As explained, like the
Biosecurity Regulation, the impact of the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, where

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Alta Reg 185/2019 [Biosecurity Regulation].
SA 2007, c A-40.2.
Biosecurity Regulation, supra note 38, s 2.
Ibid, s 4(1)(a).
Ibid, s 4(1)(b).
Ibid, s 1(1)(b).
Ibid, s 2(5).
Ibid, ss 1(1)(c), 2.
Supra note 2.
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-2 (25 February 2020)
at 4 (Hon Nathan M Cooper).
48. Supra note 2, s 2.
49. Ibid, s 1.
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animal rights activism is concerned, is to prohibit roadside vigils by members of
the Animal Save Movement and similar groups. Bill 1 was adopted in June 2020.50
Ontario has seen a similar legislative move. In December 2019, the Ontario
government tabled Bill 156, the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety
Act, 2020.51 Te Act makes it an ofence to enter an “animal protection zone”
without authorization and deems entry based on false pretences an ofence.52
An “animal protection zone” is a designated area on a farm, an “animal processing
facility,” or “prescribed premises,” where “animals may be kept or located.”53 Te
trespass provisions are meant to apply to unauthorized entry onto farms by animal
rights activists. Bill 156 also targets activism related to animals in transit: It is an
ofence to “stop, hinder, obstruct or otherwise interfere with a motor vehicle
transporting farm animals,”54 and to “interfere or interact with a farm animal
being transported by a motor vehicle without the prior consent of the driver of
the motor vehicle.”55 Like in Alberta, the latter provision is clearly aimed at the
activities of the Animal Save Movement, members of which regularly interact
with animals on trucks by talking to them, petting them, and giving them water
on hot days.56 Bill 156 was adopted in June 2020.
While the provisions related to interfering with a transport vehicle went
into efect upon royal assent, regulations were subsequently adopted to clarify
the circumstances that amount to entry under false pretences.57 Accordingly,
a person who makes a false statement in order to gain access to a farm, animal
processing facility, or prescribed premises commits an ofence.58 Te same goes
for individuals who make false statements in order to obtain employment.59
However, the regulation contains two exceptions: one for “news media”
journalists,60 and one for what it terms “whistle-blowers.” According to the
latter, where a person employed at a facility makes a false statement, consent to
50. Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-2 (28 May 2020) at
869 (Hon Nathan M Cooper). See also CIDA, supra note 2.
51. Bill 156, An Act to protect Ontario’s farms and farm animals from trespassers and other forms of
interference and to prevent contamination of Ontario’s food supply, 1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Ontario,
2020 (assented to 18 June 2020), SO 2020, c 9.
52. Ibid, s 5(2).
53. Ibid, s 2.
54. Ibid, s 6(1).
55. Ibid, s 6(2).
56. See R v Krajnc, 2017 ONCJ 281 at para 2 [Krajnc].
57. See O Reg 701/20 [Reg 701/20].
58. Ibid, s 9.
59. Ibid, s 10.
60. Ibid, s 11
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enter “shall not be considered to have been obtained under false pretences” if,
among other things, the person “obtain[s] information or evidence of harm to a
farm animal…and…the person discloses the information or evidence [of harm]
to a police ofcer or other authority as soon as practicable after obtaining the
information or evidence.”61
At frst glance, this provision seems to imply that animal rights activists
who make false statements in order to gain employment on farms to document
and disseminate animal abuse are not captured by the trespass or false pretences
provision. But a closer read makes clear that only those individuals who actually
document harm and immediately turn that information over to law enforcement
authorities are exempted from the commission of an ofence. Tis is what is known
as a “quick report law,” or a “mandatory report law.”62 While quick report laws
may seem to favour animal interests by ensuring that all abuse is reported right
away, “in intent and efect these laws impede journalistic and other undercover
investigations of food producing facilities” by making it impossible to document
repeated and persistent patterns of animal abuse, thus undermining the point
of going undercover at an animal use facility.63 Moreover, the provision states
that unless and until the moment a person actually witnesses and documents animal
abuse, they are not covered by the exception. Tus, an individual who works at a
facility but does not witness abuse right away is at risk of prosecution, until they
do. Only once they actually document abuse could they meet the exception, and
only provided they turn the information over to the authorities. Te exception,
in other words, is extremely narrow and does little to protect the work of those
committed to exposing the systemic violence of industrial animal farming. With
respect to journalists, they are only exempted if their actions do not cause “harm
to a farm animal, harm with respect to food safety or harm to an individual.”64 Te
term “harm to an individual” is defned to include “emotional or psychological
injury, including undue stress”—in other words, the documented consequences
of an individual being recorded abusing animals and, in some cases, fred as a
result,65 or, where an owner is concerned, of the negative publicity associated
with an exposé. Tis, too, makes for a narrow exception.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid, s 12(1)(c)-(d).
Marceau, supra note 11 at 1340.
Ibid at 1340-41.
Reg 701/20, supra note 57, s 11(1)(d).
See ibid, s 1; Ted Genoways, Te Chain: Farm, Factory, and the Fate of Our Food (Harper
Collins, 2014) at 135-43 (discussing the consequences of undercover investigations on
individuals exposed as animal abusers).
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As I have suggested, Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a clear limit to the
Charter right to freedom of expression, as it has been interpreted by courts and
scholars.66 Prohibitions on demonstrations on public roads and sidewalks outside
of slaughterhouses and limits on specifc messages to gain access to a property
are content-based restrictions and, accordingly, constitute prima facie limits to
section 2(b) of the Charter.67 Moreover, both activities relate to the underlying
reasons why the Charter protects freedom of expression.68 As Maneesha Deckha
explains, the activities of the Animal Save Movement are an “exercise in truth
telling.”69 Te same might be said of undercover investigations of industrial
farm operations and the dissemination and viewing of video and photographic
evidence of cruel farming practices. Indeed, the Canadian public has a right to
know how its food is produced and to make consumer choices accordingly.70
Whereas freedom of expression is about protecting “the individual’s freedom
to communicate with others,”71 prohibiting the activities of those who aim to
make public the violence of industrial animal farming cuts of a crucial and
“extraordinarily efective” source of information, “critical to public discourse,”
and with the potential to reveal “the unsavory practices of a wealthy and powerful
industry to public scrutiny.”72
Animal rights activism is also political in nature; Kathryn Gillespie writes
that “the act of witnessing animals’ predicaments, and then sharing their stories,
is a political act that resists the erasure of individual animal lives, sufering, and

66. See Lazare, supra note 7.
67. See Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927 [Irwin Toy].
68. Te underlying reasons are truth-telling, participation in political and democratic discourse,
and individual self-fulflment and human fourishing. See ibid at 976.
69. Supra note 10 at 83, citing Fuyuki Kurasawa, “A Message in a Bottle: Bearing Witness as a
Mode of Transnational Practice” (2009) 26 Teory, Culture & Society 92 at 94.
70. See Kattenburg v Canada (AG), 2019 FC 1003; Marie-Claude Desjardins & Sabrina
Tremblay-Huet, “Te Consumers’ Right to Information about Animal Welfare: Te
Canadian Framework for Labelling of Food Products of Animal Origin” in Heather
McLeod-Kilmurray, Angela Lee & Nathalie Chalifour, eds, Food Law and Policy in
Canada (Carswell, 2019) 287; Richard Moon, “Limits on Constitutional Rights: Te
Marginal Role of Proportionality Analysis” (2017) 50 Israel LR 49 at 54 (“Freedom of
expression is instrumental to the realization of social goods such as public knowledge”)
[Moon, “Limits”].
71. Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 53.
72. See Alan K Chen & Justin Marceau, “High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment” (2015) 68 Vand L Rev 1435 at 1466, 1456-57 [Chen & Marceau,
“High Value Lies”].
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deaths.”73 Similarly, Timothy Pachirat suggests that uncovering animal sufering
in hidden spaces like farms and slaughterhouses confronts viewers with “a
politics of sight, defned as organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is
hidden…in order to bring about social and political transformation.”74 Tis kind
of political activity is particularly salient in the context of industry self-regulation
and a lack of government oversight where industrial animal agriculture in
Canada is concerned.75 Moreover, Canada has the reputation of having the worst
agricultural animal transport rules in the developed world,76 something that
animal rights activists seek to expose to the broader public in order to stimulate
legislative reform.77 Te activities of animal rights activists might also be seen as
a form of individual self-fulflment and human fourishing. As I have written,
“sharing one’s deep moral convictions about animal use and exploitation, whether
in the hopes of persuading others or simply as a means of personal fulflment,
surely promotes individual autonomy and human fourishing.”78
Canadian ag-gag legislation targets not only the messages of animal rights
activists, but also the means of creating that message. Te prohibition on entry
based on false pretences—or the fact that entry on false pretences is deemed
trespass—limits protected speech, both in purpose and efect, as does the “quick
report” provision of the Ontario regulation. As Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau
73. Kathryn Gillespie, “Witnessing Animal Others: Bearing Witness, Grief, and the Political
Function of Emotion” (2016) 31 Hypatia 572 at 576 (on the “politics of bearing witness”).
See generally Gillespie, #1389, supra note 27.
74. Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (Yale
University Press, 2011) at 15.
75. See Lazare, supra note 7; Peter Sankof, “Canada’s Experiment with Industry Self-Regulation
in Agriculture: Radical Innovation or Means of Insulation?” (2019) 5 CJCCL 299; Katie
Sykes, “Rethinking the Application of the Canadian Criminal Law to Factory Farming”
in Peter Sankof, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes, eds, Canadian Perspectives on Animals
and the Law (Irwin Law, 2015) 33; Lesli Bisgould, Animals and the Law (Irwin Law,
2011) at 197-200.
76. See Maureen Harper, “Legalized Cruelty: Te Gaps in Canada’s Animal Transport Laws,”
iPolitics (26 May 2017), online: <ipolitics.ca/2017/05/26/legalized-cruelty-the-gaps-incanadas-animal-transport-laws> [perma.cc/A7E2-RG8P]. Harper states:
In my opinion, Canada has the worst animal transport regulations amongst developed nations.
Tis is based on current allowable maximum transport times for all animals. And unfortunately,
the proposed changes will still leave Canada in this unenviable position. Canadians expect
far more of their government with respect to protection of animal welfare, and our animals
deserve far better (ibid).

77. See Deckha, supra note 10.
78. Lazare, supra note 7 at 102.
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suggest in their analysis of American ag-gag legislation, the provisions amount to
a prohibition on telling a lie in order to gain access to an animal-use facility.79
In other words, the legislation dictates permissible and impermissible speech,
thus constituting a content-based restriction and a prima facie limit to section
2(b). Te efect of the legislation is to prevent speech precedent to the type of
expression carried out by undercover activists—that is, expression that seeks to
tell the truth, engages political discourse, and promotes the self-fulflment and
human fourishing of activists.
Richard Moon explains that a meaningful commitment to freedom of
expression depends on the existence of conditions that enable individuals to make
“reasoned and independent judgments and have access to diferent opinions and
reliable factual information.”80 Limiting that access, as ag-gag legislation does,
necessarily impacts the rights of both animal rights activists in their eforts
to obtain and share information, and members of the general public who are
prevented from accessing that information. In short, in both purpose and efect,
Canadian ag-gag laws amount to an infringement of section 2(b) of the Charter
by preventing members of the public from producing and “[receiving] and
[assessing] ideas and information without interference from the state.”81 What
remains to be determined is whether these limits are justifable in the interests of
a free and democratic society—that is, under section 1 of the Charter.

II. CONTEXTUALIZING AG-GAG AND THE
SECTION 1 ANALYSIS
Tis part briefy introduces the section 1 analysis as developed by the courts
and interpreted in the relevant literature and sets out the considerations that
might inform a court’s inquiry into the justifability of ag-gag legislation and
its inherent limit on Charter rights. Before engaging in the balancing test
established in R. v. Oakes,82 it is worth being explicit about what is really at stake
when Canadian courts carry out the proportionality test mandated by section
1, and courts will often engage in this contextual inquiry before embarking on
the Oakes analysis, which “clarifed the…interpretive methodology for Charter

79. Chen & Marceau, “High Value Lies,” supra note 72.
80. “Does Freedom of Expression Have a Future?” in Emmett MacFarlane, ed, Dilemmas of Free
Expression (University of Toronto Press, 2021) 15 at 15.
81. Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 58.
82. Supra note 18.
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cases.”83 Importantly, in addition to the analytical steps, Oakes established “the
need to tailor judicial review to the unique context of each case.”84 Context is the
“touchstone of section 1.”85
Rights adjudication and constitutional challenges do not take place in a
vacuum; evaluating limits on expression typically entails a judgment about the
value or harm inherent in a particular social practice.86 Indeed, the rigour with
which courts will examine a restriction on fundamental freedoms will often
depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the right being limited.87
Te speech at issue here—speech by animal rights activists and advocates—
may relate to what members of the public choose to buy at the grocery store.
But it is not proft-driven speech, which lies “far from the ‘core’ of freedom of
expression values,” and which may be easier to justify limiting.88 Rather, despite
the legislation’s purported aims, the background makes it clear that the message
targeted is both political and informational in nature; as discussed above,
animal rights activism can inform deeply personal decisions, such as what foods
to eat, what to feed one’s children, and, ultimately, what ethical relationships
with animals should look like.89 In terms of informational value, the issues
highlighted by activists might drive consumers to ask what kinds of animal use
practices they want to support with their dollars. Where politics are concerned,
the images revealed by activists might infuence observers to think about how
the law governs the treatment of farmed animals,90 and how lawmakers might
do better. Te value of this speech to members of the public means that limits
on it should be more difcult to justify. As the Supreme Court of Canada has

83. Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 SCLR 501 at 501.
84. Ibid at 503.
85. Ibid at 521.
86. See Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 58.
87. See R v Bryan, 2007 SCC 12 at para 10.
88. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 74 [RJR-MacDonald].
89. See Lazare, supra note 7.
90. In short, it does not. In Canada, the treatment of animals on farms is governed by
non-binding codes of practice, created primarily by the members of the agriculture industry
and relevant stakeholders, such as fast food restaurants and grocery chains. See Sankof,
supra note 75; National Farm Animal Care Council, “Coordinating a National Approach to
Farm Animal Welfare in Canada” (2022), online: <nfacc.ca> [perma.cc/DNR4-QALP].
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repeatedly asserted,91 “political speech lies at the core of section 2(b)…and laws
which restrict it do not warrant any deference.”92
In a similar vein, the type of legislation under review also afects the
court’s approach. Constitutional adjudication always involves some “form
of interest-balancing,”93 but where legislation aims to balance the competing
interests of diferent segments of the population—here, animal rights activists,
agricultural producers, and the general public—governments will typically beneft
from more leeway in constitutional review.94 In other words, the polycentric
nature of the legislation could suggest a more fexible standard of justifcation
and an easier onus on the government, which bears the burden of proving that
legislative limits to rights are justifed.95 Tis would not, however, absolve the
government of the need to produce clear evidence at each stage of the Oakes test.
While the standard may be less demanding in non-criminal cases, Oakes set out
a “stringent standard of justifcation” for limiting fundamental freedoms,96 and
made “empirics central to every stage of the Oakes test.”97 As Justice McLachlin (as
she then was) confrmed more than a decade later, justifcation under section 1
involves a “reasoned demonstration” that the impact of a law on Charter rights is
proportionate to its objectives and means of achieving them.98 “In short, [section]
1 is an exercise based on the facts of the law at issue and the proof ofered of its
justifcation, not on abstractions.”99 Tus, section 1 involves an inquiry into the
facts and the evidence profered by the government in support of those facts.
With respect to ag-gag legislation, it demands evidence of the reasonableness of
limiting activism in the ways the governments of Alberta and Ontario have done.
Justifcation of Charter limits is a question of balance. Where freedom of
expression is limited, the proportionality test under section 1 seeks to establish the
line between engagement, or permissible speech, and manipulation, or the type

91. See e.g. Libman v Quebec (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 569 at paras 40-43; Harper v Canada
(AG), 2004 SCC 33 at paras 13-16, 25; Tomson Newspaper Co v Canada (AG), [1998] 1
SCR 877 at paras 24-26.
92. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 515.
93. Ibid at 512.
94. See RJR-MacDonald, supra note 88.
95. For an in-depth discussion of the varying levels of deference involved in judicial review of
social policy, see Kent Roach, Te Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue, revised ed (Irwin Law, 2016).
96. Oakes, supra note 18 at 136, cited in Choudhry, supra note 83 at 506.
97. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 522 [emphasis in original].
98. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 88 at para 129.
99. Ibid at para 133.
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of speech that may be justifably restricted.100 Te ultimate question for courts
here is “whether the expression appeals to audience judgment or whether instead
it aims to manipulate or infuence the audience at a non-cognitive level,”101 the
latter being the type of speech that the government may rightfully limit; the line
between the two will be drawn in diferent places by diferent people.102 Te
remainder of this article is premised on the belief that the expression limited
by Canadian ag-gag legislation does not rise to the level of manipulation, but
rather, makes a meaningful contribution to public discourse on a matter of
observable fact. Indeed, more than engagement or permissible speech, animal
rights activism, as targeted by the legislation in question, is precisely the kind
of speech that the Charter is meant to protect—unpopular perhaps, but crucial,
in the eyes of the speakers, to truth-seeking, democratic discourse, and individual
self-fulflment and human fourishing.103 In the fnal balance, it is doubtful that
the objectives of ag-gag legislation, which the next part explores, outweigh these
fundamental interests.

III. PROTECTING INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL AGRICULTURE
AND LIMITING EXPRESSION ARE NOT PRESSING AND
SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIVES
Te frst step of the Oakes test is an assessment of whether the government has
demonstrated that the limit to rights is “pressing and substantial.”104 For Chief
Justice Dickson, a pressing and substantial objective is one that “further[s] the
values of the ‘free and democratic society’ referred to by the text of section 1.”105
In the years following Oakes, the test was a stringent one, with rights limitations
only being justifable in exceptional situations.106 With time, however, the
standard was loosened; legislative objectives need only be “valid” or “sufciently

100. See Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 57.
101. Ibid at 60. For a clear explanation of the purposes of protecting freedom of expression and
what constitutes an appropriate reason to limit speech, see also Richard Moon, “What
Happens When the Assumptions Underlying Our Commitment to Free Speech No Longer
Hold?” (2019) 28 Const Forum Const 1.
102. See Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 57.
103. See Irwin Toy, supra note 67 at 973-75 (setting out the underlying purposes of the Charter’s
protection of freedom of expression).
104. Oakes, supra note 18 at 138-39.
105. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 505.
106. See ibid at 506.
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important” to withstand section 1 scrutiny.107 Te current concept of a proper
objective has been described as one that “is intended to realize societal objectives
that are in line with the values of the state in general and are sensitive to the
place of human rights in the general social arrangement.”108 Tus, a law will
meet the frst requirement of Oakes where it aims to achieve objectives in line
with social values.
Since Oakes, the debate around the need for a pressing and substantial
objective may centre less on the standard of justifcation and more on the
requirement of compelling evidence. Stated otherwise, given the empirical
nature of the section 1 analysis, it is not enough for a government to merely
assert, in the abstract, that legislation aims to achieve a particular aim or policy
outcome. Rather, “[i]n determining whether the objective of the law is sufciently
important to be capable of overriding a guaranteed right, the court must examine
the actual objective of the law.”109 Indeed, “rights can only be justifably limited in
response to concrete, precise and real problems or harms whose existence can be
demonstrated to the satisfaction of a court through the normal trial process.”110
Te following paragraphs unpack the objectives of Canadian ag-gag legislation
and suggest that where some of the stated objectives are concerned, there is little
evidence supporting the purported harms it addresses. However, as legislation
rarely fails at the frst stage of the Oakes test,111 the main purpose of this part is
to identify the legislative objectives, as they inform the later parts of the analysis.
Te speed with which Alberta’s Bill 27 (the trespass amendments) was tabled
and adopted means that legislative intent may be difcult to uncover. But the
legislative debates are nevertheless illuminating with respect to the objectives, two
of which were made express by members of the legislative assembly. Bill 27 was
introduced by the Honourable Doug Schweitzer, Minister of Justice, who made
clear from the outset that the legislation aims, frstly, to protect property owners
from a perceived increase in rural crime: “[W]e need to make sure that Albertans
have the strongest possible property rights here in the province of Alberta. It’s
integral to make sure that property rights are respected, that landowners can feel

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Ibid at 509-10 [citations omitted].
Aharon Barak, “Proportional Efect: Te Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 UTLJ 369 at 371.
RJR-MacDonald, supra note 88 at para 133.
Choudhry, supra note 83 at 523.
But see R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 352; Canada Without Poverty v
Canada (AG), 2018 ONSC 4147 at paras 64-65; CCLA v Ontario (AG), 2020 ONSC
4838 at para 69.
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safe in their homes knowing that law-abiding citizens are protected.”112 Hansard
suggests, moreover, that Bill 27 is about protecting a certain category of property
owners: “It’s going to protect our farmers. It’s going to protect our homeowners
across this province.”113 Second, although it applies to non-agricultural property
as well, Bill 27 is expressly about protecting biosecurity and the safety of Alberta’s
food system;114 the debates acknowledge that entry onto animal farms without
the proper precautions could create a risk of transferring diseases, such as swine
fu, between animals and humans and from farm to farm.115 Finally, while not an
explicitly stated objective, an opposition MLA raised the idea that, in addition to
property and biosecurity, Bill 27 might in fact be an “efort to…stife dissent.”116
Before turning to the validity of each of these objectives, it is worth looking at the
similar goals of Alberta’s Bill 1, as well as those of Ontario’s parallel legislation.
Te lead-up to Bill 1, now the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act,117 made
its objectives quite clear. Te Bill appears to have been tabled in response to
public protests, in the form of blockades of pipelines and railways, in support of
Indigenous communities afected by proposed pipeline construction.118 Hansard
confrms these goals: Referring to infrastructure being barricaded, and prosperity
being impaired by “green zealots and eco radical thugs,” the legislation aims to
“discourage the illegal protesters, who are scaring away investors, shutting down
a large part of our economy, and potentially jeopardizing the public safety of the
workers on rail lines and critical infrastructure projects.”119 Te principal goal of
Bill 1, in other words, is to “tak[e] action to defend our vital economic interests.”120
112. Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-1 (19 November 2019)
at 2336 (Hon Nathan M Cooper).
113. Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019), supra note 36 at 2639.
114. See Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Reports of Debates (Hansard), 30-1 (26 November
2019) at 2578 (Hon Nathan M Cooper).
115. See Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 30-1 (25 November 2019)
at 2524 [Alberta Hansard (25 November 2019)]. See also Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019),
supra note 36 at 2639 (referring to the economic costs of biosecurity breaches).
116. Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019), supra note 36 at 2640.
117. Supra note 2.
118. See Kieran Leavitt, “‘Not in our Backyard’: Alberta Wet’suwet’en Rail Blockade Meets Stif
Opposition and Shuts Down After Injunction Granted,” Te Star (20 February 2020), online:
<thestar.com/news/canada/2020/02/19/new-wetsuweten-rail-blockade-pops-up-in-the-heartof-canadas-oil-country.html> [perma.cc/P5MZ-DPQQ?type=image]; Koshan, Silver &
Hamilton, supra note 20; Matthew Black, “Alberta Bill Targeting Blockade Protesters Passed
into Law,” CTV News (17 June 2020), online: <edmonton.ctvnews.ca/alberta-bill-targetingblockade-protesters-passed-into-law-1.4988429> [perma.cc/K3SN-88VJ].
119. Alberta Hansard (26 February 2020), supra note 20 at 12.
120. Ibid at 15.
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Bill 156 in Ontario had similar objectives, both stated and unstated. Te
statute’s original title—An Act to protect Ontario’s farms and farm animals from
trespassers and other forms of interference and to prevent contamination of Ontario’s
food supply—reveals its primary objectives: the protection of farmers and of
the food supply. Hansard confrms these objectives, but also raises additional
ones, such as balancing the security of farmers, who sometimes feel unsafe
when activists trespass onto their properties, the food supply, and the “right
of people to participate in legal protests.”121 Further, the legislative debates
demonstrate that, like Bill 1 in Alberta, the Ontario statute aims to respond to
industry concerns,122 and to protect economic interests in agriculture. At second
reading, the Honourable Ernie Hardeman, Minister of Agriculture, Food, and
Rural Afairs, stressed the importance of “Ontario’s diverse agriculture sector
[as] a signifcant economic driver.”123 Accordingly, “[it’s] important that we
recognize the important role that agri-food businesses play in regional economic
development, as they contribute to our broader economy.”124 Te legislation thus
demonstrates the “government’s commitment to protect the health and safety of
[the] agri-food sector.”125 As another majority MPP stated, “protecting agriculture
is a non-partisan issue. It’s something that we are all supportive of. We all support
our farmers. We all support our agriculture industry.”126
Te legislative objectives apparent from the debates, however, do not end
there. While majority MPPs emphasized the express objectives, opposition
members pointed to a less obvious legislative goal—that of silencing animal
rights activists, protesters, and undercover investigators. John Vanthof, the
opposition Critic for Agriculture and Food, and Rural Development, suggested
that the legislation is “trying to limit the impact of people who are totally
opposed to animal agriculture,” as well as limiting investigative reporting,127 and

121. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1 (10 December
2019) at 6793 (Hon Ted Arnott) [Ontario Hansard (10 December 2019)].
122. Ibid at 6797.
123. Ibid at 6795.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid. See also Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1
(18 February 2020) at 6944 [Ontario Hansard (18 February 2020)] (“agriculture is the
second-largest industry in Ontario, contributing $13.7 billion annually to Ontario’s GDP
and is essential for putting food on the tables of millions of people here and around the
world” citing a motion from the township of Warwick in support of the legislation).
126. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1 (11 December
2019) at 6820 (Hon Ted Arnott).
127. Ontario Hansard (10 December 2019), supra note 121 at 6806.

LAZARE, ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 687

that it “could be perceived as anti-whistleblower.”128 Vanthof also pointed out
that the “retroactive trespassing part”—that is, the fact that an individual who
enters a facility under false pretences is deemed to have trespassed—“has nothing
to do with biosecurity.”129 Likewise, another opposition MPP highlighted the
history of ag-gag legislation in the United States, where similar laws “designed
to silence whistle-blowers who reveal animal abuses on industrial farms,”130
and which “efectively cut of an important source of public information and
a driver of policy change,”131 have been struck down as contrary to the First
Amendment right to free speech.132 Another opposition member suggested that
the purpose is political—that the government wants to “employ wedge issues to
try and pit farmers against animal rights activists” and knows that the legislation
will be challenged in court.133 Tus, Canadian ag-gag legislation looks a lot like
its American counterpart, the objectives of which have been unpacked in the
relevant literature; in short, the history, efects, and context of the legislation “all
evince a desire to target animal rights activists and sympathetic journalists and
subject their political speech to disfavored treatment.”134
Te question, then, for each of these apparent purposes, is whether they
accord with social values, and whether the government presents “evidence of
the real, concrete harms of [the] prohibited speech.”135 As discussed above,
“governments can only justifably limit constitutional rights to respond to real
problems.”136 Certainly, governments may protect property interests, as they
do through both provincial and federal trespass legislation.137 Te inquiry here,
however, is whether the legislation responds to a concrete problem at the level
of privacy interests. Te legislative debates suggest that farmers have repeatedly
expressed concern and anxiety about unauthorized entry onto their properties,
which house not only their barns, but also their homes.138 Undoubtedly, human
128. Ibid at 6807.
129. Ibid. More about this absence of connection between the stated objectives and the
impugned measure will be said in Part IV, below, in the context of the requirement for a
rational connection.
130. Ontario Hansard (18 February 2020), supra note 125 at 6948.
131. Ibid at 6949.
132. See Wasden, supra note 14; Herbert, supra note 14; Reynolds, supra note 14.
133. Ontario Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (20 February 2020) at 7026
[Ontario Hansard (20 February 2020)].
134. Chen & Marceau, “High Value Lies,” supra note 72 at 1470.
135. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 526.
136. Ibid at 528.
137. See e.g. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 177; Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1991, c T.21.
138. Ontario Hansard (10 December 2019), supra note 121 at 6794.
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safety is a legitimate government concern. But the American experience with
similar statutes said to protect private property suggests that “the privacy intrusion
narrative is oftentimes a canard.”139 In the legislative committee hearings prior to
the adoption of Bill 156,140 an animal rights activist with experience trespassing
onto farms to occupy barns and document animal sufering explained that
activists do not threaten farmer safety:
Animal rights activists are only concerned about exposing the conditions that animals
endure. Farmers’ homes are very rarely near any animal agriculture operation due to
the strong stench of ammonia from the sheds.…[W]e only enter the barns where
the animals are. We do not need or want to see any human when we’re going into
these places.…[T]he farms are not next to any houses, and if the houses are nearby,
then we choose not to go there. We are only interested in the animals.…We are not
harming anyone.141

Tis testimony supports the idea set out by Marceau and Chen that “[t]he
privacy interests in the open areas of a large, commercial workplace are quite
diferent than the privacy interests in one’s bathroom or living room.”142 Tus,
while there may be societal consensus around the value of protecting the privacy
of farmers and farm families, the evidence before the legislature appeared to
undermine the suggestion that threats to farmer safety, and intrusions on their
privacy interests are a “real, concrete [harm].”143
Protecting biosecurity and, ultimately, the food system, may, for its part,
constitute a pressing and substantial objective in the context of the section 1
analysis, even though, as with the privacy objective, the government may have
difculty meeting its evidentiary burden. Protecting biosecurity in the interests
of a safe food system certainly aligns with societal objectives and state values.
Te lead-up to Canadian ag-gag legislation, however, potentially undercuts the
pressing nature of the need for these biosecurity measures. In 2017, an Ontario
Court of Justice judge rejected the Crown’s argument that the activities of the
Animal Save Movement—bearing witness to animal sufering during transport
and ofering pigs water on hot days—pose any kind of risk to the animals,
139. Justin Marceau & Alan K Chen, “Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age” (2016) 116
Colum L Rev 991 at 1055 [Marceau & Chen, “Free Speech”].
140. In the interests of transparency, I should disclose that I, too, took part in this hearing,
expressing a similar opinion as the one I outline here.
141. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, “Security from
Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020,” Ofcial Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1,
No G-25 (8 June 2020) at G-625-26 [Ontario Hansard (8 June 2020)].
142. Marceau & Chen, “Free Speech,” supra note 139 at 1054.
143. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 526.
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or to the food they are destined to become.144 Tese, of course, are the activities
targeted by the transport-related provisions in both provinces.145 Likewise, the
testimony of the same animal rights activist before the committee studying
Ontario’s legislation casts similar doubt on the risks to biosecurity by farm
trespassers.146 In her words, “[we] wear full biosecurity gear. We are not harming
anyone.”147 Tis testimony aligns with the observation, on the part of American
feminist geographer Kathryn Gillespie, that “biosecurity [is] more regularly used
as an excuse than a legitimate concern,”148 and that “biosecurity is a complicated
and ambiguous buzzword used in supporting the denial of access to spaces of
agricultural production under the real or perceived guise of food safety and
disease prevention.”149 Indeed, Gillespie’s conclusions about biosecurity were
informed by the experience of seeing dairy farm workers themselves “arrive to
work and complete their jobs with no protective gear or precautionary measures
to prevent the spread of disease to the animals”150—and this, despite repeatedly
being denied access to farms in the name of biosecurity. Nevertheless, and despite
these apparent weaknesses in the government’s case, a court would likely accept
the protection of biosecurity as a pressing and substantial objective. Indeed,
the threshold for demonstrating the required objective is notoriously low.151
Further, as seen, when the government is mediating between the interests of
diferent groups, it may be “aforded a margin of appreciation to form legitimate
objectives.”152 Moreover, common sense dictates that protecting the food system
from contaminants, regardless of the necessity or efcacy of those protections,

144. See Krajnc, supra note 56 at paras 2-4.
145. See Security from Trespass Act, supra note 3, ss 6(1)-(3).
146. In any event, as Part IV, below, suggests, the limit on speech inherent in the prohibition on
entering a facility under false pretences would not even apply to trespassers.
147. Ontario Hansard (8 June 2020), supra note 141 at G-626.
148. Gillespie, #1389, supra note 27 at 34.
149. Ibid at 35 [emphasis in original].
150. Ibid at 34. Descriptions of Canadian industrial agriculture echo Gillespie’s observations.
Referring to similar behaviour by employees on Canadian farms, one activist and experienced
undercover investigator has described participants in the animal agriculture industry itself
as the biggest threat to biosecurity. See Geof Regier, “No Glass Walls: Ag Gag Laws in
Canada” (Delivered at the Canadian Animal Law Conference 2020, 13 September 2020)
[unpublished] (“By far, the biggest threat to biosecurity is the industry itself—by far”).
151. See Michael A Johnston, “Section 1 and the Oakes Test: A Critical Analysis” (2009) 26
NJCL 85 at 98; Honourable Marshall Rothstein, “Lecture Section 1: Justifying Breaches of
Charter Rights and Freedoms” (2000) 27 Man LJ 171, n 10.
152. Irwin Toy, supra note 67 at 990.

690

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

is a worthwhile government objective.153 For that reason, and based on the
history of section 1, a court would likely fnd the purported protection of food
safety is sufcient to pass this frst stage of the test.
Te same cannot, however, be said for the objective of prohibiting public
protests, as Alberta’s Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, Alberta’s Biosecurity
Regulation, and Ontario’s Security from Trespass Act do, or for the apparent objective
of stifing activism and information sharing—the efect of prohibiting entry under
false pretences. Each of these activities—public protests, demonstrations, and
dissemination of information about the brutal treatment of animals in the food
system—is protected by the Charter under sections 2(b) and 2(c).154 Peter Hogg
wrote: “[A]n objective cannot provide the basis for [section] 1 justifcation if the
objective is incompatible with the values entrenched by the Charter of Rights.”155
As in the United States, “[p]reventing the public from obtaining this information
precludes the dissemination of much needed safety-related information; this
cannot be a compelling state interest.”156 Canadian ag-gag legislation interferes
with the public’s right to information about the nature of industrial farming
practices—information that enables participation in democratic life and is a
means of truth-seeking and individual self-fulflment. Even with a heightened
level of deference to complex policymaking, limiting these activities, which go to
the heart of the right to freedom of expression, is not a valid legislative objective.
Finally, in both Alberta and Ontario, lawmakers have been clear about
the economic objectives of all three relevant statutes and the goal of protecting
the agricultural industry in particular.157 Agriculture is, uncontroversially,
an important industry in Canada.158 At the same time, the Charter has not been

153. For an example of “common sense” reasoning at section 1, see RJR-MacDonald, supra note
88 at para 158.
154. Charter, supra note 15, ss 2(b), 2(c).
155. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed (Tompson Reuters, 2015) at
38-26 [Hogg, 2015].
156. Nicole E Negowetti, “Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparency and the Resurgence of
Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws” (2015) 38 Seattle UL Rev 1345 at 1378.
157. Note that there is no Hansard available for the regulations.
158. See e.g. Ontario Hansard (18 February 2020), supra note 125 at 6944; Paul Brockman &
Yiuman Tse, “Information Shares in Canadian Agricultural Cash and Futures Markets”
(1995) 2 Applied Economics Letters 335 at 355 (describing Canada as one of the largest
agriculture-producers in the world).

LAZARE, ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 691

interpreted to protect economic rights,159 including the right to earn a living160
or the right to property.161 Tese limits to the scope of Charter protection must
be taken into account when weighing such interests against the protection of a
right as fundamental as freedom of expression. Indeed, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,
dissenting in Dunmore v. Ontario (AG) (“Dunmore”), rejected the invitation to fnd
that “a policy geared to enhance the economic well-being of private enterprises”
was sufciently important to meet the frst step of the Oakes test.162 In the same
decision, however, the majority reasoned that “the protection of the family farm
is a pressing enough objective to warrant the infringement of [section] 2(d) of
the Charter.”163 More generally, the fact that “agriculture occupies a volatile and
highly competitive part of the private sector economy [and] that it experiences
disproportionately thin proft margins” made its protection a pressing and
substantial reason to limit Charter rights.164 Tis approach aligns with the historic
privileging of industrial agriculture insofar as it garners exceptional treatment in
the form of regulatory carve-outs where things like worker and animal protections
are concerned.165
Still, it is worth highlighting that decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada
validating the economic interests of private actors, or industry, as a pressing and
substantial legislative objective are sparse, and seemingly limited to the labour
context where associational rights under section 2(d) might confict with the
economic interests of private employers. Whether those interests should in fact
constitute a justifable reason to limit rights remains unsettled, with some authors
suggesting they should not. Steven Barrett and Benjamin Oliphant write that
“courts should be wary of succumbing to the temptation to justify limitations on
strike action on the basis of economic harm or inconvenience.”166 And, beyond
the labour context, “[w]hile the protection of the rights or freedoms of third

159. See Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter”
(2007) Can Issues 26; Irwin Toy, supra note 67 at 1003-04 (fnding that “corporate-commercial
economic rights” are not protected by the Charter); Gosselin v Québec (AG), 2002 SCC 84.
160. See Reference Re Public Service Employees Relations Act, [1987] 1 SCR 313.
161. See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed (Carswell, 1985) at 745-56; Philip W
Augustine, “Protection of the Right to Property under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (1986) 18 Ottawa L Rev 55 at 67.
162. Dunmore, supra note 31 at para 181.
163. Ibid at para 52.
164. Ibid at para 53.
165. See Eisen, supra note 29.
166. “Te Trilogy Strikes Back: Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for the Freedom to
Strike” (2015) 45 Ottawa L Rev 201 at 228 [citations omitted].
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parties may in some circumstances constitute a pressing and substantial objective
for the limitation on the exercise of Charter rights or freedoms, we would propose
that mere inconvenience or economic disruption rarely will.”167 Moreover,
in Dunmore, while it acknowledged the erosion of “family farms” as typical of
Ontario agriculture, the majority’s reasoning on section 1 applied to these smaller
farms and their “unique and non-commercial way of life,” and not to “corporate
farming and agribusiness.”168
Today, large corporate agri-business is quickly replacing the traditional
family farm in Canada with so-called “intensive livestock operations,”169 similar
to the well-known and problematic “concentrated animal feedlot operations,”
or CAFOs in the United States.170 In recent years, researchers documented the
“increasing concentration of power and resources in the hands of agribusiness
frms and fnancial interests [and] the marginalization of small farmers” as two of
the “dominant trends in the corporate food regime” in Canada.171 And, almost
two decades ago, others observed that the North American “livestock industry,
particularly the swine industry, has undergone dramatic concentration in the
past twenty years.”172 It seems clear that the bucolic family farm envisioned by
the Court is becoming a relic of the past; it is not what legislators seem to want
to protect in the guise of ag-gag legislation. Te major economic interests that
motivate Canadian ag-gag legislation, the apparent distinction between family
farms and industrial agribusiness, and the uncertainty around the pressing and
substantial nature of economic interests as a general matter should in fact lead
a court to reason diferently than in Dunmore on the question of pressing and
substantial objective.
167. Ibid at 229.
168. Dunmore, supra note 31 at para 52 (“Ontario is moving increasingly towards corporate
farming and agribusiness”).
169. See Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Commoditizing Nonhuman Animals and Teir
Consumers: Industrial Livestock Production, Animal Welfare, and Ecological Justice” (2012)
32 Bull Science, Technology & Society 71 [McLeod-Kilmurray, “Commoditizing”].
170. See Aurora Moses & Paige Tomaselli, “Industrial Animal Agriculture in the United States:
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)” in Gabriela Steier & Kiran K Patel,
eds, International Farm Animal, Wildlife and Food Safety Law (Springer, 2017) 185 at 185
(documenting the “horrifc institutionalized abuses” of animals on industrial farms as well as
the “public health endangerment and environmental degradation” caused by CAFOs).
171. Annette Aurélie Desmarais et al, “Land Grabbing and Land Concentration: Mapping
Changing Patterns of Farmland Ownership in Tree Rural Municipalities in Saskatchewan,
Canada” (2015) 2 Can Food Studies 16 at 17.
172. Jerry Speir et al, “Comparative Standards for Intensive Livestock Operations in Canada,
Mexico, and the United States” (Report prepared for the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, 4 February 2003) at xv.
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Nevertheless, the rarity with which laws are struck down based on the
absence of a valid objective, combined with the high level of deference granted
to governments at this frst stage of the Oakes test, mean that the legislation
would likely pass this step. It is therefore important to be clear about the precise
objective that will ground the remainder of the analysis. Te preceding paragraphs
set out the legislative objectives of ag-gag legislation generally, but the section 1
test asks courts to evaluate specifc rights-infringing provisions where that is the
case.173 Te focus here, then, should be on the limits to expression inherent in the
prohibitions on entry under false pretences, which purportedly aim to prevent
the introduction of biosecurity hazards by trespassers and to protect private
property and farmer safety. For their part, the prohibitions on interfering with
animals in transport seek to prevent the introduction of contaminants in the food
supply. Te latter prohibitions, which amount to banning public protests, also
aim to protect the industry more broadly. Assuming that protecting farmers, the
agriculture industry, and the safety of the food system are in fact pressing and
substantial objectives, the next question is whether the limits to section 2(b) are
rationally connected to these objectives.

IV. THE LEGISLATION IS NOT RATIONALLY CONNECTED TO
THE LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE
Te requirement for a rational connection between the ofending measure and
the legislative objective forms the frst part of the proportionality stage of the
Oakes test. Te question here is whether “the restrictive measure is efective in
advancing its pressing and substantial purpose.”174 As the Court described the
question in Oakes itself, the impugned measure “must be carefully designed
to achieve the objective in question. [It] must not be arbitrary, unfair or based
on irrational considerations.”175 As with the requirement for a pressing and
substantial objective, few laws have been invalidated based on the absence of

173. See Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 39-40
[Hutterian Brethren].
174. Moon, “Limits,” supra note 70 at 50.
175. Supra note 18 at 139.
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a rational connection.176 But, as Hogg observed, it does happen.177 In Ford
v. Quebec (AG),178
[t]he Court held that while the evidentiary record was sufcient to demonstrate
the importance of the government’s objective [the survival of the French language],
there was a complete absence of evidence on the critical question of whether “the
requirement of the use of French only is either necessary for the achievement of the
legislative objective or proportionate to it.”179

Te remainder of this part suggests that where Canadian ag-gag legislation is
concerned, there is likewise little evidence that the limits on expression are
rationally connected to the legislative objectives identifed above, or at least to
those likely to be accepted as valid by a court.
As seen, there are several objectives being pursued by diferent parts of the
legislation. Te prohibitions on entry onto a property or biosecurity area (in
Alberta) and an agricultural facility (in Ontario) aim to prevent the introduction
of biosecurity hazards into the food system by trespassers and to protect private
property and farmer safety. Te difculty here is that trespassers do not typically
enter properties on false pretences. Rather, they simply enter with no prior
authorization, as per both the ordinary and legal meanings of trespass.180 Indeed,
176. See Hogg, 2015, supra note 155 at 38-34.1.
177. See ibid. Te legislation under review in Oakes itself failed to meet the rational connection
requirement. See also Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation
of Students — British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31; Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11.
178. [1988] 2 SCR 712 [Ford].
179. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 526, citing Ford, supra note 178 at 717.
180. Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2020) sub verbo “trespass” (“enter
someone’s land or property without permission”); Irwin Law Canadian Online Legal
Dictionary, (Irwin Law, 2020) sub verbo “trespass” (“to enter onto the lands of another,
actionable without proof of injury” or “a term deriving from the ancient writ of trespass that
provided a civil remedy for direct damage to person and property”), “trespass ab initio” (“a
principle that deems a person who enters land as of right to be a trespasser from the moment
of entry if they abuse or exceed their licence while on the property”). Pursuant to the latter
defnition, general trespass legislation may create a similar limit to speech by punishing entry
onto a property where an individual “abuse[s] or [exceed[s] their license” (ibid), in other
words, abuses their permission to enter. Te diference between this kind of limit on speech
and that inherent in ag-gag legislation is the targeted nature of the ag-gag restriction and
the fact that the legislation contains a content-based restriction—that is, it has the clear
purpose of restricting a particular message—and accordingly constitutes a clear prima facie
infringement of section 2(b). See Irwin Toy, supra note 67 at 974 (“If the government’s
purpose is to restrict the content of expression by singling out particular meanings that are
not to be conveyed, it necessarily limits the guarantee of free expression”). In any event,
as explained, the Charter-infringing efect of the prohibition on entry on false pretences is
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as highlighted above in one activist’s testimony to the Ontario legislative committee
studying Bill 156,181 animal rights activists trespassing onto farms typically go out
of their way to avoid encountering other people, in efect depriving themselves
of the opportunity to claim they are entering on any pretence other than their
activism. Tere is no connection, in other words, between the rights limitation—
the prohibition on telling a lie in order to gain entry—and the stated objectives.
Tus, the limit on expression seems to be aimed at something else
altogether—a situation where an individual, such as an investigative journalist
or an animal rights advocate posing as an employee,182 may lie to gain entry
onto a farm in order to document repeated animal abuses and disseminate their
fndings. Indeed, such undercover investigations have been at the root of some of
the biggest, and most damaging, exposés of animal cruelty on industrial farms,183
and the adoption of ag-gag legislation is often a response to this kind of damaging
publicity. In Idaho, for example, ag-gag legislation was a direct response to an
undercover investigation by Mercy For Animals, which revealed horrifc cruelty
on a dairy farm.184 Tat law has since been struck down as a breach of the First
Amendment protection of freedom of speech.185 Te issue at the level of rational
connection, then, is the “complete absence of evidence” that these types of

181.
182.

183.

184.
185.

not geared at, so-called, petty trespassers, but rather, at those who seek to gain regular entry
to document ongoing and consistent cruel farming practices.
Ontario Hansard (8 June 2020), supra note 141 at G-625-26.
Recall that journalists are exempted from the false pretences provision in Ontario, but not in
Alberta. See Bill 27, supra note 1. Even in Ontario, it is worth highlighting that journalists
do not typically enter farms of their own accord, but rather, receive footage obtained through
undercover tactics by animal rights organizations and advocates. See e.g. Chad Derrick,
“Undercover Footage from Ontario Pig Farm Shows Alleged Abuse but New Laws May
Ban Future Probes,” CTV News (28 November 2020), online (video): <ctvnews.ca/w5/
undercover-footage-from-ontario-pig-farm-shows-alleged-abuse-but-new-laws-may-banfuture-probes-1.5207579> [perma.cc/GD6T-HZ35] (footage collected by Animal Justice
and turned over to CTV); CTV Staf, “‘Horrifc’ Abuse of Cows at BC Dairy Farm Caught
on Video,” CTV News (9 June 2014), online (video): <ctvnews.ca/canada/horrifc-abuse-ofcows-at-b-c-dairy-farm-caught-on-video-1.1860892> [perma.cc/Q48Q-MJ79] (footage
collected by Mercy For Animals and turned over to CTV). Tis practice demonstrates
the difculties with drawing boundaries between so-called traditional journalism,
whistleblowing, and advocacy, as well as the necessary connections between them.
For American examples, see Chen & Marceau, “High Value Lies,” supra note 72 at 1466.
For a Canadian example, see Postmedia News, “Undercover Investigation Reveals Horrifc
Cruelty at B.C. Dairy Farm, SPCA Recommending Charges,” National Post (10 June 2014),
online: <nationalpost.com/news/canada/undercover-investigation-reveals-horrifc-cruelty-atb-c-dairy-farm-spca-recommending-charges> [perma.cc/3FYB-B8CQ].
See Marceau, supra note 11.
See Wasden, supra note 14.
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activities constitute a threat to biosecurity or farmer safety.186 Tis absence of
connection was precisely what motivated another American court to strike down
similar legislation. Judge Gritzner of the United States District Court, Southern
District of Iowa, reasoned:
Defendants have produced no evidence that the prohibitions [on entry under
false pretences] are actually necessary to protect perceived harms to property and
biosecurity.…Defendants have made no record as to how biosecurity is threatened
by a person making a false statement to get access to, or employment in, an
agricultural production facility.187

Te idea, of course, is that an animal rights activist who obtains employment
in order to document farm practices will be trained, like any other employee,
and expected to adhere to biosecurity protocols.188 Trespassers are distinct from
those who enter on false pretences, and while they may or may not introduce
contaminants onto farms—although there is little evidence that they do—that is
irrelevant to the relationship between prohibiting entry on false pretences and the
stated legislative objectives, which seem to have no connection at all.
Similarly, there is little evidence of any relationship between the prohibitions
on interacting with animals in transport and the stated objective of protecting the
food supply. As discussed with respect to the legislative goal of protecting food
safety, the legal system has previously rejected, based on an absence of evidence,
the suggestion that members of the Animal Save Movement, who protest on
public roads and bear witness to the sufering of animals as they are trucked of
to slaughter, pose any biosecurity hazards to the animals that they attempt to
comfort and, in turn, to the food system.189 In R. v. Krajnc, Anita Krajnc, the
founder of the Animal Save Movement, was charged with the crime of mischief
for giving water to pigs on a transport truck on a hot summer day, as Krajnc and
fellow protestors regularly did.190 At trial, the Crown suggested that Krajnc “gave
‘an unknown substance [or] possible contaminant’ to the pigs, thereby creating
a risk that the slaughterhouse would refuse to take them.”191 Te judge rejected
this theory, based on an absence of evidence that either the truck driver or the
slaughterhouse showed any actual concern about a possible contaminant:

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Choudhry, supra note 83 at 526.
Reynolds, supra note 14 at 825.
See Herbert, supra note 14 at 1213.
See Krajnc, supra note 56.
See ibid.
Ibid at para 58.
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[71] Crown counsel argued that Ms. Krajnc created a risk that the slaughterhouse
would refuse the load on the basis that they might be contaminated. Te farmer
and the truck driver both testifed that this possibility caused them very real
concern.
[72] Again I fnd that this is completely contradicted by the evidence.
[73] Protesters had given water to pigs before. Te driver was aware of this. Te
slaughterhouse was aware of this. Despite this, the slaughterhouse had never
refused to accept a load of pigs for that reason.
[74] As I stated above they did not reject that particular load on that particular
day.192

A fnding by one trial judge is not a conclusive statement on the evidentiary
basis for Canadian ag-gag legislation. But it is telling that the only judicial
pronouncement on the relationship between slaughterhouse protests and the risk
of contaminating the food supply involves a categorical rejection of the purported
connection. Justice Harris’s reasoning in R. v. Krajnc seriously undermines
the existence of the rational connection required of constitutionally justifable
rights infringements.
As discussed, all of the ofending provisions, and ag-gag legislation generally,
are related to the broader objective of protecting and supporting the agriculture
industry. Assuming that protecting the economic interests of private actors
constitutes a pressing and substantial reason to limit fundamental rights, which
remains unclear, this objective poses further problems at the level of rational
connection. As suggested in the legislative debates,193 by MPPs studying Bill 156
at committee,194 and by research out of the United States and Canada,195 ag-gag
legislation may do more harm than good to the reputation of industrial animal
agriculture. Rather than protecting the industry, the removal of transparency
inherent in ag-gag legislation, which shields the industry from public scrutiny,
has been shown to erode public trust in farmers and to increase support for

192.
193.
194.
195.

Ibid at paras 66-74 [emphasis in original].
See Ontario Hansard (20 February 2020), supra note 133 at 7026.
Ontario Hansard (8 June 2020), supra note 141 at G-600.
See JA Robbins, DM Weary & MAG von Keyserlingk, “‘Ag-gag’ Laws Increase Negative
Perceptions of Farm Animal Welfare and Decrease Trust in Farmers” in Diana Elena
Dumitras, Ionel Mugurel Jitea & Stef Aerts, eds, Know Your Food: Food Ethics and
Innovation (Wageningen Academic, 2015) 297; JA Robbins et al, “Awareness of Ag-gag Laws
Erodes Trust in Farmers and Increases Support for Animal Welfare Regulations” (2016) 61
Food Policy 121.
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animal welfare.196 Paradoxically, then, by undermining public confdence in
animal agriculture, ag-gag legislation achieves the exact opposite of the legislative
objective—instead of protecting, it risks harming the industry and the economic
interests of farmers. In other words, it is entirely inefective in advancing its
purpose and accordingly does not meet the requirement that rights-limiting
legislation be rationally connected to its objective.

V. THE LEGISLATION IS NOT MINIMALLY IMPAIRING
Te test for minimal impairment, the second stage of proportionality, has
been restated a number of times in the years since Oakes. In 2015, Hogg
described it as the “requirement of least drastic means.…Te idea is that the
law should impair the right no more than is necessary to accomplish the desired
objective.”197 In practice, however, courts do not typically look for the “least
intrusive” measure, but rather, seek to ensure that the “‘challenged measure…
only impair[s] Charter rights as little as is reasonably possible’ and [ask] whether
there is some reasonable alternative scheme.”198 Given that courts regularly defer
to governments balancing diferent interests, the question here is often “whether
it could be said that the government had a ‘reasonable basis’ for concluding that
it had impaired the right as little as possible.”199 Tat said, as highlighted above,
where the speech being limited is political in nature, the degree of deference
aforded by the court will be low.200 Importantly, given the rarity with which laws
fail at the previous two steps, minimal impairment “has turned out to be the
heart and soul of [section] 1 justifcation.”201 Moreover, as with the other parts
of the Oakes test, the evidence is paramount in determining whether the limits
are among a range of reasonable options for the government to meet its desired
objectives. Te following paragraphs suggest that ag-gag legislation does not meet
this standard and accordingly fails the minimal impairment test.
Tere are reasonable alternatives with lesser impacts on rights that would
achieve the objectives of protecting biosecurity, farmer safety, and the overall
integrity of the food system. In fact, it is possible to achieve each of these
196. See Ontario Hansard (20 February 2020), supra note 133 at 7026 (“A 2016 study from the
UBC found that when the public learns of so-called ag gag laws, it erodes trust in the farmers
and increases support for animal welfare regulations”).
197. Hogg, 2015, supra note 155 at 38-36.
198. Choudhry, supra note 83 at 507 [citations omitted].
199. Ibid at 511, citing Irwin Toy, supra note 67 at 994.
200. See Choudhry, supra note 83 at 515.
201. Hogg, 2015, supra note 155 at 38-36.
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objectives without limiting freedom of expression at all, especially given the
tenuous connection, demonstrated above, between the restriction on speech
and the objectives. Te legislation, in both Alberta and Ontario, increases
existing penalties for trespassing onto private property or an agricultural facility,
respectively, and prohibits entry on false pretences by deeming it a trespass. Te
penalties (fnes, jail, or both in Alberta and fnes in Ontario), and the legislation
more generally, are meant to dissuade activists from trespassing onto farms and
occupying animal enclosures in order to achieve the broader objectives.202 As set
out already, however, it is not clear how the prohibition on entry under false
pretences relates to these objectives. It stands to reason, then, that these objectives
can be achieved without limiting expression. Indeed, the most efcient way to
dissuade trespassing in order to promote biosecurity and farmer safety seems to be
by prohibiting trespassing. And while it is not for courts to impose what they view
as the best solution to a particular policy problem,203 it is incumbent on them to
hold governments to account when legislation limits rights unnecessarily. Here,
prohibiting trespass alone, without restricting expression, would achieve the
legislative goal and would limit freedom of expression less than the false pretences
provisions. Accordingly, these provisions limit rights more than necessary and
thus fail the minimal impairment test.
Te protection of biosecurity can also be achieved through less impairing
measures that do not limit high-value speech. For example, at the federal level,
Bill C-205,204 which died on the order table when the 2021 election was called,
would have amended the federal Health of Animals Act so as to prohibit the
introduction of a “disease or toxic substance” into a place where animals are
kept.205 In other words, the amended legislation would protect against biosecurity
202. See Alberta Hansard (25 November 2019), supra note 115 at 2523-24; Ontario Hansard
(10 December 2019), supra note 121 at 6801.
203. See RJR-MacDonald, supra note 88 at para 160 (“If the law falls within a range of
reasonable alternatives, the courts will not fnd it overbroad merely because they can
conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement”); Hutterian
Brethren, supra note 173 at para 54.
204. An Act to amend the Health of Animals Act, 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020.
205. Ibid, s 1. Interestingly, Bill C-205 was originally aimed only at people without lawful
authority to be on a farm (i.e., trespassers), and prohibited the introduction of contaminants
only by that category of individuals. At Second Reading, the Bill was amended by the
Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food to apply to any individual who
introduces a risk of disease to animals, in recognition of evidence that trespassers (i.e., animal
rights activists) have never been responsible for a disease outbreak, and that outbreaks are far
more likely to result from industry practices. See House of Commons, Standing Committee
on Agriculture and Agri-Food, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, No 40 (17 June 2021). Again, in the
interests of transparency, I participated in this process as well.
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threats by limiting exposure to contaminants and not by limiting speech.
Surely, this bill demonstrates the existence of alternative means of achieving
the principal legislative objective of ag-gag legislation that are less harmful to
fundamental freedoms.206
It is tempting to view the exceptions for journalists and employee
whistleblowers in Ontario’s regulation as a means of narrowing the restriction
on expression so that the law only impairs rights minimally.207 Recall that where
an employee of an animal use facility gained entry to that facility based on false
pretences, they are not deemed to have trespassed, provided they document
harm to an animal and immediately turn it over to authorities.208 As explained,
this obligation, or quick report requirement, by preventing the documentation
of systemic and repeated patterns of abuse, undermines the reason for going
undercover on a farm. As for journalists, they are exempt only if they do not cause
harm to an animal, to food safety, or to an individual.209 But the term “harm to
an individual” is defned to include “emotional or psychological injury, including
undue stress.”210 It is difcult to imagine the negative press that results from an
exposé disclosing animal mistreatment not causing some kind of psychological
injury or stress to the individuals involved. Further, the regular work of industrial
animal agriculture necessarily harms—and, where meat is concerned, kills—
animals. Tus, the exceptions, limited as they are, do little to minimize the rights
infringements inherent in Ontario’s law.
Finally, Ontario’s legislation is extremely broad in application. Te
regulation defnes farm animal, with whom individuals are prohibited from
interacting,211 as animals bred for a number of purposes including “[t]o propel
vehicles” (e.g., carriage horses); “[t]o be ridden for pleasure” (e.g., horses ridden
recreationally); “[t]o be shown publicly” (e.g., at a petting zoo); and “[t]o
undertake competitions” (e.g., race horses).212 None of these activities forms part
of the food system. In characterizing the places these kinds of animals are kept
as those where trespassing risks compromising biosecurity and food safety, the
legislation overreaches or impairs rights more than is necessary. A law genuinely
206. Tis is not an endorsement of the policy rationale for Bill C-205, which, based on the
relevant debates and the Bill’s original form, was clearly aimed at restricting animal rights
activism. It is merely an example of a less impairing way of achieving a similar objective.
207. See Reg 701/20, supra note 57, ss 11, 12.
208. Ibid, s 12.
209. Ibid, s 11(1)(a).
210. Ibid, s 1.
211. Security from Trespass Act, supra note 3, ss 5(4), 6(1), 6(2).
212. Reg 701/20, supra note 57, s 5.
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aimed at protecting farmer safety and the food system would stop at the borders
of personal property and food production and would limit speech only as much
as necessary to achieve those objectives. Te real possibility of less impairing
measures thus makes clear that both Ontario’s and Alberta’s legislation fails
the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test. Tis failure, either alone or
in conjunction with the absence of a rational connection, is enough for a court
to declare the legislation of no force or efect. But in the interests of being
comprehensive, the following part will briefy weigh the efects of the legislation.

VI. THE LEGISLATION IS NOT PROPORTIONATE IN
ITS EFFECTS
Te fnal stage of the Oakes test asks “whether the Charter infringement is
too high a price to pay for the beneft of the law.”213 Here, the positive and
negative impacts of an impugned measure are weighed and the requirement of
proportionality is met when the positive efects outweigh the negative. While
courts have varied in their emphasis on this part of the analysis and some scholars
have questioned its utility,214 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada has
emphasized its importance. In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,
Chief Justice McLachlin not only confrmed that the proportionality of efects
test is integral to section 1, but also clarifed the rationale of the analysis, as well
as the meaning of the salutary and deleterious efects to be balanced. Accordingly,
whereas the earlier stages of the Oakes test—pressing and substantial objective,
rational connection, and minimal impairment—“are anchored in an assessment
of the law’s purpose,”215 the fourth stage takes full account of the “severity of
the deleterious efects of a measure on individuals or groups.”216 In other words,
as it examines the impacts of legislation on their own, and not in connection
with the legislative objective, the proportionality of efects test involves a more
subjective assessment than the preceding inquiries.
Salutary efects are straightforward; they are the benefcial efects of the
legislation in question. As Hogg suggested, they will typically align with the
legislative objective, already accepted as pressing and substantial.217 With respect
to Canadian ag-gag laws, then, the benefts would, assuming these objectives
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Hogg, 2015, supra note 155 at 38-43.
For the idea that this part of the test is unnecessary and “redundant,” see ibid at 38-44.
Hutterian Brethren, supra note 173 at para 76.
Ibid [citations omitted].
2015, supra note 155 at 38-44.
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were accepted by a court, align with the goals of protecting the safety of farmers
and their property, and guarding against the introduction of biosecurity threats
to the food system by trespassers and activists outside of slaughterhouses.
Deleterious efects are less clear cut and, as with much analysis under the
Charter, vary according to the case and the seriousness of the limit in question.
Referring to a restriction on religious freedom, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote
that “[t]here is no magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a particular
limit” and that seriousness will depend on the nature of the practice.218 Te same,
of course, might be said about freedom of expression, with the efect that limits to
political speech—that is, the type of expression limited by ag-gag laws—should
be viewed as particularly severe. Indeed, where constitutional protections are
concerned, “no lie is more valuable than the lie that enables important speech
on issues of public concern.”219 Te negative efects of Canadian ag-gag laws,
in other words, are considerable.
Chief Justice McLachlin further suggested that the evaluation of a law’s
deleterious efects will depend on its impacts “in terms of Charter values,
such as liberty, human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of
democracy.”220 As seen, ag-gag laws constitute a restriction on political speech—
that is, speech meant to enhance democracy. Moreover, for many animal rights
activists, their commitment to their cause may be comparable to religious or
conscientious beliefs,221 such that limits on their ability to manifest their beliefs
through activism constitute an afront to their liberty and dignity. Where ag-gag
laws are in force, animal rights activists have a choice between getting their
message out and facing possible penalties, on the one hand, or remaining silent
218.
219.
220.
221.

Hutterian Brethren, supra note 173 at para 89.
Chen & Marceau, “High Value Lies,” supra note 72 at 1507.
Hutterian Brethren, supra note 173 at para 88.
See Harold A Herzog Jr, “‘Te Movement is My Life’: Te Psychology of Animal Rights
Activism” (1993) 49 J Soc Issues 103; Donna D Page, “Veganism and Sincerely Held
‘Religious’ Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection without Defnition” (2005) 7 U Pa J Lab
& Employment L 363; Bruce Friedrich, “Te Church of Animal Liberation: Animal Rights
as ‘Religion’ under the Free Exercise Clause” (2014) 21 Animal L 65. Contra Jan Dutkiewicz
& Jonathan Dickstein, “Te Ism in Veganism: Te Case for a Minimal Practice-based
Defnition” (2021) 6 Food Ethics 1. Tere is a need for further research on the connection
between freedom of conscience and religion as interpreted in Canada and animal rights
activism, and the related question of whether Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a restriction
on the section 2(a) Charter guarantee of freedom of conscience, as something distinct from
religious freedom. For present purposes, however, there is literature suggesting that limits
on the right to participate in animal rights activism and to express one’s ethical and political
commitments regarding animals do impact the liberty and dignity of those who espouse
these commitments.
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in the face of the unspeakable violence that animals experience on industrial
farms, in transport, and in slaughter, on the other.222 Tis is not a “meaningful
choice.”223 Instead, as Justice LeBel reasoned, dissenting in Hutterian Brethren,
“When signifcant sacrifces have to be made to [exercise constitutional
freedoms] in the face of a state imposed burden, the choice to [do so] is no
longer uncoerced.”224 Add to this the idea that undercover investigations and
slaughterhouse protests are some of the only ways to bring to light the sufering
of farmed animals and the weight of the negative impacts of ag-gag legislation
becomes very clear. Proportionality of efects is a subjective inquiry. But surely,
the absence of a meaningful choice, combined with restrictions on political
speech and the related impacts on activists’ liberty and dignity, outweigh any
salutary efects of Canadian ag-gag legislation.

VII.CONCLUSION
Tis article completes the argument that Canadian ag-gag legislation, recently
adopted in a number of Canadian jurisdictions, constitutes a restriction on the
constitutional right to freedom of expression that cannot be justifed under
section 1 of the Charter. After reviewing the ways that prohibitions on entry
under false pretences and interference with motor vehicles transporting farmed
animals limit high-value political speech—the kind of speech that lies at the heart
of the guarantee—the article sets out the challenges that governments might face
in attempting to justify the restrictions under the section 1 Oakes test. Tis is not
a novel story, but one that has already played out south of the border. American
ag-gag legislation dates to the early 1990s and has taken many forms—from
rarely-used food libel laws, also known as “agricultural disparagement statutes,”
to prohibitions on non-consensual recording on farms, and prohibitions on entry
under false pretences,225 similar to those that I have scrutinized here. Indeed, where
ag-gag laws are concerned, legislators seem infuenced by cross-border policies in
both directions. Where Canadian trespass laws originated in the United States,

222. On the appropriateness of using the word “violence” to describe the regular practices of
industrial farming, see Gillespie, #1389, supra note 27 at 21 (describing how “violence
against certain lives and bodies can become so normalized that it is not viewed as
violence at all”).
223. See Hutterian Brethren, supra note 173 at para 163, LeBel J, dissenting.
224. Ibid at para 167.
225. See Marceau, supra note 11.
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the transport-related provisions in Alberta, Ontario, and Manitoba have now
been exported to Iowa as well.226
As discussed above and elsewhere,227 all of these laws in both Canada
and the United States were drafted in response to the activities of undercover
journalists, whistleblowers, and animal rights activists who have made visible
what the corporate animal agriculture industry wishes to hide.228 Moreover,
in the United States, many of these statutes—particularly those that mirror the
ones at issue here—have been ruled unconstitutional for their interference with
the First Amendment right to free speech. Canadian ag-gag legislation, then,
raises the same contest of values between the goal of protecting a billion-dollar
industry through secrecy and concealment on the one hand, and the pursuit
of truth and information about important subjects of public debate on the
other. While the legal approach may difer in Canada given that courts tend
to tolerate greater intrusions on free expression,229 my analysis suggests that the
same interests that prevailed in the United States should triumph here as well.
Indeed, information about how animals in the food system are treated is no
less important to the Canadian public than it is to Americans, and, as seen, the
evidence connecting ag-gag legislation and its purported objectives is equally
weak on both sides of the border.
While protecting both the safety of farmers and the food system may
be valid legislative objectives, there is little evidence that these things are
threatened by the kinds of animal rights activism the legislation aims to prevent.
Moreover, it is an open question whether protecting the economic interests of
industrial agriculture constitutes a pressing and substantial objective in line
with the Charter jurisprudence; there are compelling reasons to conclude that
the economic protection of a billion-dollar industry should not be permitted
to trump the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution,
particularly when the rights in question are fundamental to citizen engagement
with, and participation in, democratic and political processes. At the level
of rational connection, neither the history nor the evidence supports the
relationship between the prohibited expression—entry onto farms and bearing
226. See US, HFF 655, A Bill for an Act Prohibiting Interference with the Transportation
of an Agricultural Animal, and Providing Penalties, 89th Gen Assem, Reg Sess, Iowa,
2021 (enacted).
227. See Lazare, supra note 7.
228. See Marceau, supra note 11.
229. See e.g. Léonid Sirota, “Compelled Speech: A Conscience- and Integrity-Based Approach”
in MacFarlane, supra note 80, 151 at 156 (“To be sure, [the Supreme Court of the United
States] is generally more solicitous of the freedom of expression than Canadian courts are”).
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witness on public roads—and the mischief being targeted; activists take steps to
avoid harming both humans and nonhuman animals. Te legislation is also not
minimally impairing; there are ways of achieving the stated objectives that do less
harm to Charter freedoms. In terms of proportionality of efects, the fnal stage
of the section 1 analysis, legislators behind Canadian ag-gag legislation have a
difcult case to make. Ag-gag laws impact Charter values in serious ways. For
some activists who have made an ethical commitment to call out and combat the
incredible cruelty of industrial animal farming, the laws preclude a meaningful
choice between carrying out their conscientious beliefs and being charged and
potentially imprisoned (in Alberta) or fned. Tat absence of individual choice
afects the dignity and autonomy of people committed to challenging and
changing the ways that we, as a society, relate to nonhuman animals. Tese kinds
of deleterious impacts will not be easily outweighed by the purported objectives
of Canadian ag-gag legislation.
Analyzing rights infringements using the Oakes framework has become a
routine part of constitutional adjudication and decision-making in Canada. But
section 1 justifcation was not always understood as a habitual or standard practice.
Indeed, “drafters of the Charter envisaged section 1 as a way of occasionally
preserving the abilities of legislatures to determine the primacy of particular
policies or values.”230 As Kent Roach has written, section 1 enables courts to
examine “adverse efects of laws in exceptional cases.”231 It does not empower
governments to trample on the civil liberties guaranteed by the Charter in order
to immunize from public scrutiny the hidden cruelty inherent in large-scale
industrial animal farming. But in the years since its adoption in 1982, and
especially since the Oakes test was set out, “the Court has become overwhelmingly
deferential to governmental assertions about the importance and justifcation”
of rights-infringing legislation,232 at the level of the legislative objective233 and
throughout the remainder of the analysis. In ag-gag legislation, courts have a
clear and straightforward opportunity to re-establish the constitutional limits
involved in policy-making that negatively afects high-value expression.
Tis article focuses on the difculties involved in justifying Canadian ag-gag
legislation’s impacts on the right to freedom of expression. But ag-gag laws
provide an opportunity for other constitutional inquiries and contributions to
230. Janet L Hiebert, Limiting Rights: Te Dilemma of Judicial Review (McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1996) at 52 [emphasis added].
231. Supra note 95 at 384 [emphasis added].
232. Hiebert, supra note 230 at 79.
233. Ibid.
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the literature on interpreting Charter protections and raise important questions
about the privileged treatment of the agriculture industry in Canada. Future
research will explore whether ag-gag laws also limit freedom of conscience
insofar as an ethical commitment to nonviolent and respectful relationships
with nonhuman animals might qualify as a comprehensive belief system
grounded in secular morality and deserving of the protection of section 2(a) of
the Charter. Tis is a particularly timely inquiry given parallel developments in
the United Kingdom and legal proceedings currently underway in Canada.234
Moreover, as stated at the outset, there is a need for further critical inquiry into
Canadian agricultural exceptionalism—the idea that, for a number of reasons,
and as exemplifed by ag-gag legislation, “regulators should treat agriculture as
an exceptional sector.”235 Indeed, privileged protections for the industry appear
to align with the increased concentration of the agri-food industry and the rise
of “Intensive Livestock Operations” in Canada, both of which merit scrutiny
given the demonstrated negative impacts of intensive animal farming on human
rights, health and safety, nonhuman animal interests, and the climate.236 For
present purposes, however, the freedom of expression and justifcation analyses
are sufcient to raise signifcant red fags about both the constitutionality and the
general wisdom of Canadian ag-gag legislation.

234. See Adam Knauf, “Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (Application Schedule A)”
(29 May 2018), online: www.canadianlawyermag.com/staticcontent/AttachedDocs/
Adam%20Knauf.pdf [perma.cc/27ND-GMCJ]; Casamitjana v Te League Against Cruel
Sports (3 February 2020), No 3331129/2018, online: UK Employment Tribunals <www.
gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions/mr-j-casamitjana-costa-v-the-league-against-cruelsports-3331129-2018> [perma.cc/M56E-2U2A].
235. Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 29 at 149.
236. See McLeod-Kilmurray, “Commoditizing,” supra note 169.

